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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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2 November 1964

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USSR: [Private remarks last week by Mikoyan's son developed the theme that the overriding factors in Khrushchev's removal were his erratic domestic policies and his disregard for the views of other Soviet leaders.]

[In a talk with Ambassador Stevenson on 29 October, Sergo Mikoyan, an economist in Moscow's Institute of Economics and International Relations, emphasized the importance of collective decisions in the party presidium and the probability of changes in Khrushchev's agricultural and industrial policies. He said that, although there would be no change in emphasis on economic expansion, the "organization and administration of industry" would be modified.]

[Mikoyan indicated that Khrushchev is still a member of the party central committee and that he is now living in his villa outside Moscow under doctors' care.]

[His comments on the Sino-Soviet split seemed to indicate that fundamental differences cannot be removed but that the new Soviet leaders will moderate the tone of the conflict if the Chinese will follow suit. Mikoyan observed that the Soviet attitude toward Peiping reflected the views not only of Khrushchev but also of the entire presidium. He blamed the Chinese for the public exacerbation of the conflict.]

[Mikoyan said there would be no change in Soviet policy toward Cuba, but he recognized that this issue could interfere with an improvement in Soviet-US relations. He argued that Cuba's policy is "defensive" and that noninterference must be mutual.]

[The Soviet president's son reiterated the standard line that the USSR will make no payments for UN

(continued)

peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East, but he repeated several times that a compromise must be found on this issue.]

[Ambassador Stevenson reported that Mikoyan seemed to expect significant changes, presumably a relaxation, in US foreign policies after the election and appeared to be disappointed with the ambassador's reply that there was no reason to expect such a shift.]

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Sudan: The new government is likely to assume a more neutralist policy than the preceding military regime.

The complexion and initial pronouncements of the new civilian cabinet suggest that it may adopt a stronger line against Western interests in Africa and the Middle East--such as the Congo and over-flight rights. The army has withdrawn to its barracks and is not actively participating in the government, but it appears to retain the balance of power.

Normal activity is returning to the country as the general strike has been called off, airports and communications have been reopened, and about 500 political prisoners have been released.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTE

India: Plans by India's dissident Communist "leftists" to formalize their organizational structure and to spell out their extremist and generally pro-Chinese ideological line have been severely hampered by government action. By 31 October, the day the dissidents were to begin their first independent party congress, 26 leaders of the ultra "leftist" West Bengal party--which had been expected to dominate the week-long proceedings--had been summarily imprisoned. The government's quick action not only prevents the attendance at the Calcutta congress of the most outspoken extremists but also serves to remind the rest that the extremist route is a sure path to prison.

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DAILY BRIEF

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